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1. Introduction - “This time it’s different”? 
“The elections to the EP fail as instruments of democracy as they do not ad-
equately connect people’s policy preferences to the decision making pro-
cesses in the EP and to the public policy of the European Union” 
(Franklin and Hobolt 2011: 72). 
Criticism such as the one brought forward by Franklin and Hobolt (2011) regarding the func-
tioning and role of the European Parliament (EP) is not rare. European elections are second-
order elections and thus less important than national elections because there is less at stake 
(Reif, Schmitt 1980)1. Several scholars have asked to put the office of the Commission Presi-
dent to election to raise the stakes (Føllesdal, Hix, 2006; Hobolt and Tilley 2014; Hix 1998, 
2008, 2009). Having candidates compete for the presidency would be a first step to open politics 
of the European Union (EU) to politicisation (Hix 2008). Politicisation can be understood as 
the increase of salience of an issue in the public debate and increasing polarisation of the posi-
tions concerning the issue (Hutter, Grande, Kriesi 2016). This politicisation would alleviate the 
perceived democratic deficit of the EU in two ways. First, the personalised competition of dif-
ferent visions about European integration would finally give the elections a more European 
character. It would better inform and mobilise citizens and thus create a real mandate for policy 
change (Føllesdal, Hix 2006: 534). Second, it would enable citizens to hold their representatives 
accountable (Hobolt, Tilley 2014: 126). In the 2014 elections this suggestion was implemented. 
“This time it’s different”, claimed the EP before the 2014 EP elections (EP 2014). The institu-
tional innovation of the introduction of the lead candidates - “Spitzenkandidaten” was next to 
the Euro-crisis a development that promised to change the nature of the 2014 European elec-
tions fundamentally.  
This is why this text seeks to analyse the following: Did the introduction of the Spitzenkandi-
daten lead to a politicisation of public debate during the 2014 EP election campaigns in com-
parison to the preceding EP elections of 2009? This shall be done by analysing the to date 
unpublished media content analysis data set “EuroPol” of Braun and Grande. Politicisation shall 
be measured in terms of salience and polarisation of public debate in four West-European mem-
ber states: United Kingdom, France, Germany, Austria. The dataset consists of the content 
                                                 
1 For an overview of the second-order literature see also: Corbett 2014, Franklin, van der Eijk 1996, 
Hix and Marsh 2007, 2011, Hobolt and Wittrock 2010, Marsh, 1998, Marsh and Mikhaylov 2010, 
Niedermayer 2014, Schmitt 2005, Schmitt, Teperoglou 2015, Schmitt, Toygür 2017, Träger 2016. 
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analysis of two qualitative newspapers in each country (e.g. Süddeutsche Zeitung and Frank-
furter Allgemeine Zeitung in Germany) analysed by the core-sentence method. 
The Spitzenkandidaten were an important attempt to cope with the second-order character of 
European elections and to contribute to higher legitimising potential of the European institu-
tions and policy-outcomes. Therefore, it is of a high social importance to evaluate their perfor-
mance. This has already been done in a broad variety of aspects. This work provides some new 
insights by evaluating in a comparative manner the impact of the Spitzenkandidaten on public 
debate in several countries. Furthermore, it measures the impact on politicisation of the public 
debate concerning the EU. Being of great importance to further legitimise the EU, the impact 
on public debate is usually assessed as a prerequisite for the future of European Integration (Hix 
2008). 
This text is structured as follows. First, the current state of research that has evaluated the 
Spitzenkandidaten’s success will be presented (Chapter 2). The next section seeks to provide a 
theoretical framework for the analysis. The theory of second-order elections will be presented 
in more detail and an initial analysis will be provided about whether the 2014 EP elections 
followed these second-order effects (Chapter 3.1). Afterwards recent critique to the EU’s dem-
ocratic deficit, its accountability deficit (Chapter 3.2) and some suggestions what should be 
done to cope with it (Chapter 3.3), will be formulated. Evolving politicisation as one mode of 
reducing a democratic deficit on the input side, shall be defined and operationalised (Chapter 
4). Afterwards, the research design will be explained, and the control variables will be pre-
sented. Finally, the results will be presented (Chapter 5) and interpreted in light of a democratic 
deficit and the future of the European Union’s politicisation (Chapter 6). 
The overall results show that the effects of the Spitzenkandidaten had no influence on the po-
liticisation of the public sphere in 2014. Against all theoretical assumptions, there was no in-
crease in politicisation from 2009 to 2014. Salience of EU issues decreased and even though 
there was a slight increase in polarisation none of the tested factors (Spitzenkandidaten, EU-
sceptic parties or the Euro crisis) had any major impact on this. This leads to the conclusion 
that even though there might be a growing politicisation of concerning European integration in 
general (Hutter, Grande, Kriesi 2016), this did not result in a spill-over effect into political 
contest by the Spitzenkandidaten during the 2014 European elections and thus had no impact 
on the general nature of the European elections. 
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2. State of the Art – The Spitzenkandidaten’s (non-)impact 
When the Spitzenkandidaten were introduced, hopes were high that this would be the first step 
to democratic politics in the EU (Hix 2008: 164). A change in the formulation of the Lisbon 
treaty now connected the European Council’s right to nominate the President of the Commis-
sion with the requirement to “[t]ak[e] into account the elections to the EP” (TEU 17:7) before 
nominating a candidate. Hence the EP used the opportunity to ask the European party families 
to nominate lead candidates and to ask the “candidates to play a leading role in the parliamen-
tary electoral campaign, in particular by personally presenting their programme in all Member 
states” (EP 2012: 2). This reinterpretation of the EP, which was legally questionable (Christi-
ansen 2016: 995), has been finally accepted by the Council and created a precedent. 
In consequence each pan-European party family nominated one or two candidates to compete 
for the Presidency of the Commission: Jean Claude Juncker for the European People’s Party, 
Martin Schulz for the Party of European Socialists, Guy Verhofstadt as candidate of the Alli-
ance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, ALDE, Ska Keller and José Bové for the European 
Green Party, and Alexis Tsipras for the Party of the European Left. They all together held a 
budget of €4.5 million. Regarding this rather low amount they managed a considerable presence 
on the ground, visiting EU countries, and online, with Schulz as the altogether most engaged 
(Schmitt et al. 2015: 5f). The candidates also participated in TV debates between April 9 and 
May 20 2014 which were broadcasted on Euronews, the internet and selected national TV chan-
nels, reaching 15% of European citizens who saw at least one of them (ibid.). 
The hope was that the Spitzenkandidaten would create a better electoral connection and thus an 
increase in the legitimacy of “Parliament and the Commission by connecting their respective 
elections more directly to the choice of the voters” (EP 2012: 2). This was supported by the 
European Commission in the hope that “this [would] increase the legitimacy of the President 
of the Commission, the accountability of the Commission to the EP and the European electorate 
and, more generally, increase the democratic legitimacy of the whole decision-making process 
in the Union” (COM 2013: 17). 
There is a range of literature evaluating the performance of the Spitzenkandidaten. In summary, 
the effects of the Spitzenkandidaten are evaluated as being minor in all respects. The turnout 
remained low at 42.61% and voting still followed the second-order mechanism (Christiansen 
2016: 998). Some conclude that this is only due to a missing framework and experience in this 
first try that will have to be established in the following elections while others doubt that the 
Spitzenkandidaten have the power to establish such a framework and that this deficit lies in the 
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nature of the EU (Hobolt, Tilley 2014a: 150ff). The following presentation of the research is 
structured by the different areas that were hoped to be influenced by the Spitzenkandidaten.  
Party Level 
Parties are the main political actors at the European level (Hix and Lord 1997). In previous 
European elections the campaigns were very compartmentalised (Christiansen 2016: 997), var-
ying from member state to member state (Guinaudeau, Persico 2013: 163). So the expectation 
was that the Spitzenkandidaten would strengthen European wide collaboration of the European 
parties to make a common and coherent election campaign (Føllesdal, Hix 2006: 556). It was 
crucial for the success of the Spitzenkandidaten System that “national parties would […] direct 
voters’ attention to the candidates for European Commission President, and to the policies that 
those candidates propose” (Franklin 2014: 10). 
This was not the case. Even though the Euro-parties strengthened their own position at the EU 
level through the process of the Spitzenkandidaten nomination (Put et al. 2016), there were no 
signs of a centrally organised European wide campaign. The EP election campaigns were still 
dominated by national parties and national politicians (Hobolt 2015: 9). Only few parties put 
emphasis on the Spitzenkandidaten system or the candidates in their manifesto (Braun, Popa 
forthcoming). Those who did put any emphasis on the Spitzenkandidaten, only dedicated them 
little space – even if they were part of a European party that nominated a candidate. They were 
at least more likely to put emphasis on the Spitzenkandidat if he was from their home country 
but “a political debate on [the Spitzenkandidaten] – initiated by the political parties – simply 
did not take place” (Braun, Popa forthcoming: 5). An analysis testing the appearance of the 
Spitzenkandidaten in the online campaign of parties on Facebook – a platform characterised by 
highly personalised party strategies, come to a similar conclusion. The attention of political 
parties to the Spitzenkandidaten and their efforts to put them in the spotlight of their campaigns 
was very low (Braun, Schwarzbözl unpublished). Possible expectations on the national parties 
to personalise their election campaigns to the Spitzenkandidaten by the strategic consideration 
of strengthening the relevance of the elections and the electoral connection by making the can-
didates visible to their voters, are not fulfilled. 
Media coverage 
“The intermediary role of the mass media is of crucial importance” (Schulz 2016: 24) in a com-
plex system of governance such as the EU, to create a link between the European institutions 
and the citizens by informing about politics. In European elections, the media covered less ex-
tensively (ibid.) and was accused of not providing sufficient information (Hobolt Tilley 2014). 
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Hix formulates the expectation that the personalisation would encourage the reporting of the 
media (Hix 2008: 164). There are two aspects of interest here: the mere appearance and visibil-
ity of the Spitzenkandidaten in the media and the informing and mobilising effect of the highly 
praised TV debates through personalisation. 
There is a growing visibility of the Spitzenkandidaten after the debates and closer to the elec-
tions themselves, with Schulz as the most visible actor followed by Juncker (Gattermann 2015: 
219). Leidecker and Wilke (2016a: 228) state that 2014 was, according to their analysis of the 
German media coverage of the European elections, clearly different from previous election 
coverage not only in the scope but also in the intensity of the issues concerning Europe. Since 
the introduction of the European elections in 1979 the coverage has increased significantly and 
the grade of personalisation of the media coverage has nearly doubled from 2009 to 2014. In a 
second publication Leidecker and Wilke (2016b: 131) test the model of second rate coverage – 
the coverage of second-order elections compared to first order elections is less extensive and 
prominent– in comparing the German federal elections to European elections. Especially in 
2014, they find a tendency to convergence. Reports on the EP elections were broader, more 
intense and personalised than ever before with a high focus on the Spitzenkandidaten. There-
fore, even though the 2014 elections to the EP remained second-order, the coverage did not 
remain second rate. These results point out that the Spitzenkandidaten may have had an influ-
ence on media coverage in Germany, but these results cannot be applied to other countries. 
Another qualitative media content analysis by Schulze (2016: 31) reaches the conclusion that 
compared to the previous elections the media coverage has increased to an amount that seems 
sufficiently high to inform and mobilise the voters, but she finds scarcely signs that this was 
due to the presence of the Spitzenkandidaten as she finds no personalising effects. The 
Spitzenkandidaten appeared more as a side issue and not as the centre of attention and were 
most visible in the German press followed by France, while they remained nearly unmentioned 
in British newspapers (ibid.: 32).  
The second important aspect concerning media coverage are the highly-praised TV debates. 
Maier, Faas, Rittberger et al. (2017: 17) find that the debate had an informing character that 
increased the awareness of the importance of the EU. Unfortunately, range of the debates was 
low as only 15% of the European citizens were watching at least once (Schmitt, Hobolt and 
Popa 2015: 5). 
Information of the citizens and turnout 
Personalisation was hoped to create identifiable leaders (Schmitt et al. 2015: 5) and that their 
competition would bring distant Brussel’s bureaucracy (Hobolt 2015: 8) closer to the citizens 
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and that it would mobilise voters to take a higher interest in European elections and increase 
their probability to turn out (Schmitt et al. 2015: 2; Schulz 2016: 24). 
Candidate recognition indeed positively affected the likelihood of citizens to participate. Citi-
zens who knew the candidates were more likely to turnout (Schmitt et al. 2015: 17). But this 
finding is a fairly minor effect as only a minority of the voters were able to identify the 
Spitzenkandidaten correctly (19% Juncker, 17% Schulz, 9% Verhofstadt). Furthermore, the 
Spitzenkandidaten led not to a personalisation of voting behaviour (Gattermann, de Vreese 
2017). Spitzenkandidaten were found to have a polarising effect: to those citizens opposed to 
European integration the awareness of the Spitzenkandidaten only reinforced their opposition 
while those who are in favour of European integration also support the introduction of the 
Spitzenkandidaten as an increase in democratisation (Rohrschneider, Schmitt, Popa 2015: 476). 
In sum: “The majority of Europeans did not vote in these elections, let alone take an interest in 
the choice between the specific candidates” (Hobolt 2014: 1536). 
Politicisation and Europeanisation of the debate 
By competing with their political programmes, the Spitzenkandidaten were firstly expected to 
raise the degree of politicisation and secondly set European issues on the agenda. This increase 
of salience and polarisation of the European Integration’s issue would reinforce the public 
sphere and thus fulfil the claims of the input-side legitimacy theories. The European issue might 
override national borders and traditional cleavages to create a coherent pan-European debate. 
This Europeanisation of European elections would finally give them their own character and 
relieve them from their second-order character. 
“‘Europe’ was more salient than in previous elections albeit for reasons that were entirely un-
connected to the treaty modification of the commission president” (Hobolt 2014: 1534). Despite 
the efforts of the Spitzenkandidaten to run a campaign that was “distinctively European in its 
outlook”, the details of their policy programmes played hardly any role in the elections (ibid.: 
1538). 
The new procedure of appointment had no impact on politicisation of the EP elections and did 
not bear the potential of “party-political competition or a genuine choice between rival political 
programmes” (Christiansen 2016: 1007). It rather led to an institutional politicisation as it real-
located the inter-institutional balance of power positively for the parliament in regard to the 
Council (Christiansen 2016) than a party-ideological politicisation (Heidbreder, Auracher 
2014: 230). The transformation of the European elections ensuring the choice between alterna-
tive visions for Europe and hold the executive to account has not taken place in the elections 
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and might be a process that takes some time, as the Spitzenkandidaten system still is in its 
infancy (Hobolt 2014: 1538). 
Relevance 
However, there is a core question that has not been answered sufficiently in the literature by 
now, namely whether the introduction of the Spitzenkandidaten in fact led to the goal formu-
lated by Hix (2008) – the politicisation of EU politics through electoral contest of different 
candidates competing for the voters with their different visions of the EU. This leads to the 
research question this thesis seeks to answer:  
Did the introduction of the Spitzenkandidaten lead to a politicisation of public debate during 
the 2014 EP election campaigns in comparison to the preceding EP elections of 2009? 
In the aforementioned literature, there has been media content analysis about the visibility of 
the Spitzenkandidaten in the media coverage, their impact on changing and increasing media 
coverage by personalisation. But e.g. Leidecker and Wilke (2016 a, b) only explore Germany, 
Gattermann (2015) only had an overall case volume of 470 articles and neither Gattermann 
(2015) nor Schulze (2016) have collected any cases to compare e.g. lead candidates in national 
campaigns. This is where this work can contribute, as the data set analysed enables it to compare 
to previous elections, to analyse the mere presence of the Spitzenkandidaten in the electoral 
campaign, to get a deeper insight about the character of appearance of the Spitzenkandidaten in 
the public debate. The Spitzenkandidaten were an important attempt to cope with the second-
order character of European elections and to procure higher legitimising potential of the Euro-
pean institutions and policy-outcomes. Therefore, it is of a high social relevance to evaluate 
their performance. 
In the following, the theoretical framework on which the hypothesis is based will be introduced. 
3. Theory – Spitzenkandidaten to increase politicisation 
3.1 The EP elections: a solution to the democratic deficit? 
The literature on legitimisation of the EU is divided in the camps of input (Hix 2008; Hobolt 
Tilley 2014; Habermas 2012) and output legitimisation (Scharpf 1999; Majone 1998; Moravc-
sik 2002). The output-oriented camp adheres to the elite-driven technocratic character of the 
foundation days with independent supra-national institutions, legitimising themselves by their 
ability to produce the best possible policy output, free from ideological ideals (Moravcsik, 
Scharpf). They argue that the EU already is as democratic as possible and that any further in-
clusion of the citizens would lead to a politicisation blocking the anyhow fragile and complex 
process of legislature (Føllesdal, Hix 2006: 533). 
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Against this position, input-based theorists argue that this would be “benevolent authoritarian-
ism” (Føllesdal, Hix 2006: 534). The EU has a democratic deficit since it lacks the most im-
portant aspect of a democracy “contestation for political leadership and argument over the di-
rection of the policy agenda” (Føllesdal, Hix 2006: 534). The EU produces policies without a 
political debate or a political choice on these policies taking place. Therefore, Hix asks for 
opening the EU gradually to political competition (Hix 2009: 100). 
The introduction of direct elections to the EP and the successive strengthening of the EP as an 
institution were attempts to cope with the perceived democratic deficit of the EU. Following 
the first EP elections in 1979, Reif and Schmitt (1980) evaluated that in fact, European elections 
are so called “second-order elections”. According to second-order theory, European Elections 
(second-order elections) are treated as less important than national elections (first-order elec-
tions) by the parties, the media and the voters because the “representative body which is elected 
has very little real power thus even less is at stake” (Reif, Schmitt 1980: 12). European elections 
as second-order elections are thereby characterised by a low level of politicisation and electoral 
mobilisation, which leads to a small turn-out rate (Schmitt 2005: 651).2 In addition to this, vot-
ers use the second-order-elections to express their dissatisfaction with governing parties and to 
blame them following the regular order of national electoral cycles (Reif, Schmitt 1980: 10). 
Moreover, it has been demonstrated that in second-order elections, when there is no government 
at stake, people tend to vote more “sincerely” for a small or new party that is closer to their own 
ideological position which they could not vote for in their national first-order election. This is 
especially important in absolute majority voting systems, where voters have to support a large, 
established party and vote “strategically”. This leads to a loss in vote share for bigger parties in 
second-order elections (Reif, Schmitt 1980: 9). As parties, political actors, activists, and the 
media do not attribute high significance to European elections the “generally subdued campaign 
means that fewer voters might even learn that elections are being held” (Reif, Schmitt 1980: 9). 
Reasons for this seem to be multiple and interrelated, because the coverage of the media and 
by this the “contribution […] to the electoral mobilisations” is dependent on the intensity and 
investment of first-order politicians to second-order campaigns (Reif, Schmitt 1980: 14). But 
again, the voter’s intention to turn out to vote correlates with whether they are aware of the 
campaign activities (Reif, Schmitt 1980: 28). Especially as the European electoral arena is 
                                                 
2 As Franklin has shown the “low voter turnout is not a symptom of disaffection from the regime within which 
elections are held but rather an indication that the elections themselves were less than compelling” (Franklin 2014: 
2). The often named decline of turnout is due to the EU eastern enlargement and the behaviour of voters in post-
communist EU member countries that have no such tradition of voting but high rates of affection for the EU 
(Franklin 2014: 1)  
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complex and far from easy to understand for the voters. Reif and Schmitt already suggest that 
“regionalisation and personalisation […] could increase turnout” (Reif, Schmitt 1980: 13). 
As the EU has grown and its impact has increased one might ask if this has diminished the 
second-order effects. But the literature testing and contesting second-order criteria on European 
elections still confirms them (Franklin, van der Eijk 1996; Hix and Marsh 2007, 2011; Hobolt 
and Wittrock 2010; Marsh, 1998; Schmitt 2005). In addition, the elections of 2014 were still 
second-order elections. Turnout was still low, governing parties lost respective to smaller more 
ideological parties, electoral cycles still were relevant (Corbett 2014, Niedermayer 2014, Träger 
2016). Neither the ongoing politicisation of the EU nor the introduction of the Spitzenkandi-
daten nor the economic crisis changed the second-order character of the 2014 EP elections 
(Schmitt and Teperoglou 2015; Schmitt, Toygür 2017). High discontent with the austerity 
measures and the surge of Euroscepticism did not trigger lasting political change and lead to 
“critical elections” that would have reshaped the relation between social groups and their polit-
ical agents profoundly (Schmitt, Teperoglou 2015: 292).  
3.2 Criticism on the legitimising potential of European elections 
There are two functions that elections should to some extent fulfil in a democracy to have a 
legitimising effect (Marsh, Mikhaylov 2010: 17). Firstly, the function to create a mandate. The 
agenda of a party is presented and discussed during the electoral campaign and the voters get 
informed about the issues and directions in the policy a party stands for. By this they make their 
vote choice and give thus the party the mandate to realize these (information function). Second, 
elections have to allow the citizens to hold their governments responsible for what they have 
and have not done during their time of office (sanction function). In representative democracies, 
where voters as principals delegate their powers to governing agents, it is a fundamental ele-
ment that the voters may also hold these elected agents accountable for their performance and 
sanction them by the mechanism of elections (Hobolt, Tilley 2014a: 143). Are these criteria 
met by European elections? The second-order literature comes to a crushing conclusion in their 
findings as both criteria are not met.  
The information function is not fulfilled, because in the campaign of EP elections the voters are 
not sufficiently informed about the different political agendas. This is due to the fact that parties 
made low efforts in campaign spending (Franklin, Van der Eijk 1996). EU elections are still 
rather about national than about European issues (Hix, Marsh 2007: 496; Reif, Schmitt 1980: 
3). Additionally, they are treated by the parties as “mid-term contests” in which parties search 
for approval regarding their national policy (Hix, Marsh 2007: 495; Franklin, Van der Eijk 
1996: 367). Furthermore, the voters’ knowledge of the party positions on EU issues is low 
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because parties avoid to position clearly on EU issues.3 There is only a weak electoral connec-
tion between the citizens and the MEP’s, not sufficient to create a real democratic mandate for 
governance (Hix, Marsh 2007: 507; Van der Eijk, Franklin 1996: 368). “Without a real mandate 
the democratic deficit will persist” (Van der Eijk, Franklin 1996: 377). 
The second function, namely the sanctioning function is also not met. The electorate can only 
hold governments or politicians accountable, if it is able to attribute responsibility for a certain 
policy to the right level of government, the national or the European level, the right European 
institution and then identify a certain political actor (Hobolt, Tilley 2014a: 144). In a system of 
multi-level governance as the EU this is highly complicated for voters (ibid.: 124). The EP 
elections apparently do not serve as a mechanism to hold those accountable who are responsi-
ble, because it appears to be nearly impossible for voters to identify the party or politician ac-
tually responsible (ibid.: 131). This has implications on the legitimacy of the EU. A solely out-
put-based legitimisation becomes problematic if the institutions fail to deliver. If the EU is 
found responsible for poor performance but cannot be held accountable for it, trust in the insti-
tutions and confidence with the system as a whole will decline (ibid.: 147).  
„Elections are at the very heart of democracy “(Franklin, Hobolt 2011: 75). This is why Euro-
pean elections have been introduced. But these elections couldn’t hold what was promised be-
cause of their second-order character. This suggests that there is a need to strengthen the elec-
toral connection somehow, so EP elections may fulfil the information and sanction function. 
The next chapter shall give an overview over the concept of politicisation and how the 
Spitzenkandidaten System could help contribute to the strengthening of electoral connection, 
hereby alleviating the democratic deficit. 
3.3 The democratic deficit and the impact of politicisation 
“Politicisation of European integration is defined as an increase in polari-
sation of opinions, interests or values and the extent to which they are pub-
licly advanced towards the process of policy formulation within the EU” 
(De Wilde 2011: 560). 
This definition is misleading in the case of politicisation of European integration where issues 
have already been decided at governmental level and are only recognized and publicly dis-
cussed afterwards. This explains the claim that there should be more public debate about the 
European Commission’s agenda from the outset before governmental decision. 
                                                 
3 As van der Eijk and Franklin show (1996: 370) parties avoid to become clear on their stance on European inte-
gration because it would show their (often high) inner divisiveness on the issue. Parties that are divided on the EU 
issue have worse chances in competition. 
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For an issue to be politicised Hutter, Grande and Kriesi (2016) define three dimensions. Politi-
cising an issue means that it is made subject of public discussion and regulation (De Wilde, 
Zürn 2012: 139). For this purpose, it has to be transferred from the private sphere to become 
salient in public sphere and then become subject in the sphere of governmental decision-making 
(ibid.: 140). Salience describes the increased visibility of an issue in public debate. It captures 
how often and how long an issue is discussed by the relevant actors. An issue can only become 
politicised if it is articulated and discussed in public. Furthermore, the opinions expressed on 
the concerned issue are increasingly diverse. Polarisation describes the intensity of conflict re-
lated to an issue among the different actors involved. A high level of politicisation must involve 
strong opposing camps (Grande, Hutter 2016: 8). This is manifested by societal actors like pol-
iticians, interest groups or the mass media and by voters at the ballot box contesting certain 
public policy, which Grande et al. call actor expansion (Grande, Hutter 2016: 8). 
A politicisation of an issue might entail a politicisation of the concerning decision-making pro-
cess and by this of the deciding institution (De Wilde 2011: 563). Institutions as the Commis-
sion, the EP and Council as well as national governments and parliaments (De Wilde 2011: 
560) become “politicised when party politicians gain a tighter grip on their operations leading 
to increasing prominence of party political conflict” (De Wilde 2011: 561). Decision-making 
processes may be politicised when politicians gain more influence “at the expense of profes-
sionals, like bureaucrats, experts and lawyers” (De Wilde 2011: 561).  
Politicisation has three functions. Firstly, the function of structuring political conflict. As polit-
ical parties at national and supra-national level articulate opinions that may be found in society 
related to the EU, preferences are being aggregated. The politicisation of the European elections 
would create a link between policies, the elected officials and the preferences of citizens as they 
force the political elites to develop rival policy visions and programmes presented by rival can-
didates competing for office. By this competition a mandate for political change is produced 
(Hix, Marsh 2011: 136). 
Secondly, politicisation raises the question of legitimacy as raising salience and the controver-
sial character indicate the discontent of citizens about their lack of influence on European issues 
compared to the impact that European integration indeed has on their lives (De Wilde 2011: 
564). The increase of partisan conflict and debate on European issues would provide the elec-
torate with a meaningful choice during the elections, as real alternatives would crystallise, 
which can lead to more deliberation and participation. Thereby, “politicisation can contribute 
to alleviating the EU’s democratic deficit” (De Wilde 2011: 565). 
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The third function is the politicisation’s potential of altering the course of integration. European 
integration has not been politicised at all for a long time as there was no big debate or interest 
in the topic and there was a quiet consent that ‘European integration was a good thing’ (De 
Wilde 2011: 565). The increase in authority of the EU has led to a transformation of the EU 
from an international organisation to a political system (De Wilde, Zürn 2012: 138; Zürn 2006: 
244), as it is no longer market-making but policy-making (Marks 2004: 258). This politicisation 
of the EU politics cannot be reversed as its policies create winners and losers of the political 
process (Hix 2009: 100). In their “post-functionalist theory of European integration” Hooghe 
and Marks (2008) state that the ‘sleeping giant’4 has been awoken. This means, that EU policies, 
polities and politics have become contentious. In their analysis of the politicisation of national 
public spheres concerning European integration Hutter, Grande and Kriesi find that there is a 
gradually growing politicisation (Grande, Kriesi 2016: 279 ff.). However, and in contrast to 
Hooghe and Marks, they find “a ‘negative relationship’ between politicisation and European 
integration” (ibid. 2016: 282). 
3.4 Hypotheses 
This theoretical derivation leads to the assumption that the Spitzenkandidaten could have helped 
to alleviate the legitimacy and accountability deficit. They were expected to introduce political 
competition by their presentation of rival policy visions and programmes presented in their 
campaign competing for office. It was expected that due to the personalising effects of the 
Spitzenkandidaten there would be a politicised public debate about European, thus creating a 
real mandate for the elected president. By now responsibility could be attributed more easily. 
There would finally be some electoral modus for the citizens to hold the government to account. 
And by giving the citizens something real to vote about, the executive office, the head of the 
European Commission, there would finally be something at stake, which would in turn lead to 
giving the elections real importance, motivating the media to coverage, informing the citizens 
and the electorate to turn out, and finally limit the second-order character of EP elections. How-
ever, this analysis seeks to test whether this introduction of the Spitzenkandidaten system really 
led to a politicisation of the European public sphere.  
 
                                                 
4 As the authority of European Integration grew, Checkel and Katzenstein (2009: 2) observed a ‘politicization of 
European identity’ since the late 1980s and Van der Eijk and Franklin (2004: 34) found that there was in fact a 
huge potential of politicization and contestation on the European Union in the citizen’s opinion which they call 
“sleeping giant”. They stated that this giant potential was still sleeping as there is no possibility for voters to 
articulate their position on European integration as it was not thematised by political parties, the issue was polar-
ized but not salient, but that it would be only a question of time until policy entrepreneurs would start to derive 
their benefit from it (Franklin, Van der Eijk 2004: 48). 
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This leads to the following hypotheses: 
H 1: The introduction of the Spitzenkandidaten to the European elections led to an increase 
in politicisation of the public debate during the election campaign in 2014 compared to 2009. 
This Hypothesis shall be tested with help of two sub-hypotheses. 
H 1.1: The issue of Europe in the general public debate of the campaign was more salient 
due to the Spitzenkandidaten in 2014 than it was in 2009. 
This only is a necessary but not a sufficient precondition to politicisation. Therefore. another 
sub-hypothesis H 1.2. is necessary: 
H 1.2: The polarisation of public debate on the Europe issue was higher due to the 
Spitzenkandidaten in 2014 than it was in 2009. 
Hypothesis H 1 will be evaluated in the affirmative if both of the sub-hypothesis are supported 
by the results. 
4. Concept of analysis and methods 
Data foundation 
To analyse the question a (yet unpublished) data set of relational content analysis is used that 
has been gathered as part of the DFG- funded project “European elections and structuring of 
political conflict” by Edgar Grande and Daniela Braun. The project seeks to analyse whether 
European elections are characterised by an own potential to structure political conflict and thus 
create a close electoral connection between the citizens and the institutions of the European 
Union. This would be crucial for them to reach any mobilising and legitimising impact. There-
fore, a close connection between the programmes of the parties, the preferences of the voters 
and their public discussion is necessary. 
The centre of analysis are the national debates of electoral campaigns. These are coded with 
help of the core-sentence method. A core sentence is the smallest analytical unit of a sentence 
and always includes an actor and his/her position on a subject and thus combines a subject and 
an object via a predicate. This method is highly suitable for quantitative media content analysis 
as they include information about the position of an actor and the salience of an issue. There 
are two different kinds of core-sentences: the actor-issue sentence, including the statement of 
an actor about an issue, and the actor-actor sentence, describing the relation between two actors. 
To describe the general position of the actor to an issue or another actor they use a scale from -
1 to 1, in which -1 indicates criticism or rejection, 0 indicates a neutral position and 1 stands 
for agreement or affirmation. The values of -0.5 and 0.5 capture probabilities or conditional 
statements (Grande et al. 2014: 49). 
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 Subject  Quality  Object  Issue  Core Sentence  
Actor-
issue  
          
  Merkel,  
Angela  
CDU  




"Nie wieder Krieg in Europa", fasst die 




          
  Merkel,  
Angela  
CDU  






„Sie schätzt seine europäische Überzeu-
gung.“  
  
Figure 1: Core sentence 
Case selection 
The data set by now includes four EU member states and four European elections: 1999, 2004, 
2009 and 2014. The analysed countries are Austria, France, Germany and the UK. This sample 
ensures that representativeness is as high as possible regarding the grade of consolidation of 
their democratic systems, the length of their time as member states, the depth of the integration 
and the citizen’s attitudes to European integration. As France and Germany were founding 
members, Great Britain joined the EU in 1973 and Austria in 1995. While Germany, France 
and Austria are deeply integrated in the European Union, Great Britain is neither member of 
Schengen nor the Euro-zone. 
The medium of analysis are national quality newspapers as “quality newspapers not only report 
more frequently but also more comprehensively on the EP elections than tabloid media, which 
rarely cover the elections at all” (Schulze 2016: 24 f.). These were in Germany: “Süddeutsche 
Zeitung”, “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung”; in France: “Le Monde”, “Le Figaro”; in Great 
Britain: “The Times”, “The Guardian”; in Austria: “Die Presse”, “Der Standard”. Braun and 
Grande defined the last four weeks before the election day as the critical period of the campaign. 
The selection of articles proceeded as follows: in a first step, articles to all relevant issues in the 
survey period are evaluated (NPW dataset). In the second step, only articles with reference to 
the European Union are selected and coded (PolEU dataset). The NPW data will be used to 
analyse the salience, the PolEU data for the polarisation and to take the appearance of the 
Spitzenkandidaten in the public debate under scrutiny. 
Operationalisation 
This analysis is based on the operationalisation and method of measurement by Hutter, Grande 
and Kriesi (2016) in their previous work on “Politicizing Europe”, where they analyse the 
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“long-term structural effects of politicisation on political conflict in Europe” (Grande, Hutter 
2016: 26). They define Politicisation “as an expansion of the scope of conflict within the polit-
ical system” (Grande, Hutter 2016: 7). To measure this scope of conflict they distinguish “three 
conceptual dimensions of politicisation: issue salience (visibility), actor expansion (range) and 
actor polarisation (intensity and direction)” (Kriesi 2016: 33). For an issue to be politicised they 
expect it to fulfil all three dimensions. However, this analysis focusses on salience and polari-
sation and neglects actor expansion as it is difficult to conceptualise and does not have a signif-
icant impact on the value of politicisation in the end. 
Salience (H1.1) shall be measured by the “share of core sentences related to European integra-
tion as a percentage of all core sentences related to any political issue” (Grande et al. 2016: 
301). The more an issue is discussed the more in can become politicised (De Wilde 2011: 567). 
This is why Grande et al. conceptualise salience as the necessary but not sufficient, most basic 
dimension for politicisation (Grande, Hutter 2016: 8). Polarisation occurs if multiple, conflict-
ing demands for collective goods are put forward purposive and the diversity of opinions in-
creases: “The more opinions of involved parties diverge and crystallise into opposing groups, 
the stronger polarisation of opinion contributing to increasing politicisation” (De Wilde 2011: 
567). In this analysis, the mean of the variance of the general direction of the different parties 
on an issue is used to measure polarisation (H2.2). 
Method of Analysis 
This work wants to check whether the introduction of the Spitzenkandidaten had any effect on 
the politicisation of the European elections. So, the introduction of the Spitzenkandidaten is 
regarded as a treatment factor in a quasi-experimental design to a setting where all the other 
factors stay the same or are controlled for with help of the control variables.5 By this, the effect 
of the Spitzenkandidaten can be extracted. The analysis of the empirical findings shall proceed 
in a descriptive way as the four cases of countries are not sufficient to make any statistical 
calculations on correlating effects.  
Variables 
The model of analysis is an x-based one checking the influence of the independent variable on 
the dependent one. In this case to answer the question of the influence of the Spitzenkandidaten 
                                                 
5 Already Maier, Rittberger et al. (2017) described “the 2014 EP election campaign [as an] ideal quasi-experi-
mental setting” in their analysis of the impact of the TV debates on citizens information and perception “to explore 
whether the expectation that increased political competition improves the electoral connection and hence the qual-
ity of democracy is borne out in reality” (Maier et al. 2017: 4). 
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on the politicisation, the dependent variable is the politicisation of the public debate and the 
independent one the introduction of the Spitzenkandidaten. 
“’Europe’ was more salient than in previous elections albeit for reasons that were entirely un-
connected to the treaty modification of the commission president” (Hobolt 2014: 1534). As-
suming that there were other factors favouring the politicisation of the 2014 EP elections and 
distorting the impact of the Spitzenkandidaten on public debate, the following factors shall get 
included into the analysis: EU-sceptic parties, the Euro-crisis, “Home-game effects” and the 
effect of how friendly on European Integration a country is.  
EU-sceptic parties: Eurosceptic parties were the clear winners of these elections (UKIP with 
26.6% winner of the UK, Front National in France won the elections with 25,4%) (Hobolt 2015: 
6; Schmitt et al. 2015: 17). “Rather than jumping on the train of the Spitzenkandidaten, EU 
citizens voted a record number of candidates from Eurosceptic parties into the European Par-
liament” (Treib 2014: 1542). But it cannot be dismissed as a mere protest vote, by those, who 
feel left behind by the mainstream parties and who have suffered the most from the crisis, 
against the establishment. The electorate is deeply worried about the domestic effects of EU 
membership and “Eurosceptic parties are here to stay” (Treib 2014: 1551). 
Euroscepticism can be defined as “disapproval to European integration” (Hobolt 2015: 12). 
There is a differentiation between hard and soft Euroscepticism (Taggart Szczerbiak 2004) and 
right and left Euroscepticism. Hard Eurosceptics reject European integration as a whole and ask 
for withdrawal, soft Eurosceptics accept integration but oppose specific policies or institutional 
aspects. Right Euroscepticism, where the majority of Eurosceptic parties can be found, ad-
dresses national sovereignty and speaks out against immigration (Hobolt 2015: 12). Left Euro-
scepticism asks for more redistributive measures from an anti-capitalist stance. There is a well-
founded presumption that EU-sceptic parties had an influence on the public debate as well in 
2014 compared to 2009. Eurosceptic parties are drivers of politicisation as they take a clear 
opposing stance on the general pro-EU stance of the mainstream parties, who tend to de-em-
phasise Europe (Grande, Hutter 2016: 24). So, one might expect that they increased the salience 
and polarisation on European integration significantly. The categorisation of Eurosceptic par-
ties includes both, left and right and soft and hard Eurosceptic parties. There are all the Euro-
sceptic parties included that that have been coded in the data set. 
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- FN : Front Na-
tional  
- DLR : Debout la 
République 





- FW: Freie Wähler 
- UKIP: United King-
dom Independence Party 
- Conservatives  
- BNP – The British Na-
tional Party  
- Sinn Fein  





 - PCF : Parti 
communiste fran-
çais  
- LO: Liste ou-
vrière  
- die Linke - no2eu  
 
Table 2: EU-sceptic Parties  
Euro-crisis: The European Elections of 2014 took place in the worst economic crisis in post-
war Europe (Hobolt 2015: 6). This economic crisis had brutally brought to light the huge redis-
tributive consequences of the common market to the daily life of each European citizen. The 
premise of European legitimacy – as the EU as bringer of greater prosperity to all the member 
states – was no longer valid. This led to a decline in trust in the EU (Hobolt 2015: 10), deepening 
divisions between south, north, east and west, and politicised and polarised the opinions about 
the direction of European integration across member states (Christiansen 2016: 992). Grande 
and Kriesi found in their analysis of the politicisation of European integration by the Euro-crisis 
that it did not lead to a quantum leap in politicisation but was nevertheless one of the events 
increasing the politicisation of European integration over time (Grande, Kriesi 2016 479), not 
changing the patterns of politicisation but strengthening nationalist trends (Grande, Hutter 
2016: 28). Hobolt states that in contrary to the Spitzenkandidaten (Hobolt 2015: 10) it was the 
euro zone crisis that was the decisive factor turning the European election 2014 to “the most 
“European” electoral contests to date” (Hobolt 2015: 19). This leads to the assumption, that the 
Euro-crisis may have made the issue of European integration more salient in the 2014 cam-
paign. The data include a whole issue that has been coded for the Euro-crisis with several sub-
issues to capture all the facets of public discussion of Euro-crisis. This issue shall be used to 
analyse the effect of the Euro-crisis. 
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“Home game”-effects: The Spitzenkandidaten were to a high degree unknown outside their 
home countries before their nominations (Hobolt 2014: 1535). They were the most cited, visi-
ble, known and successful in their countries of origin. This is true respective the TV debates 
e.g. in Luxembourg the home country of Juncker 36% of the population watched the debates 
(Schmitt et al. 2015: 5), as for the newspaper coverage, e.g. Schulz concentrates in Germany 
the half of all the coverage about the Spitzenkandidaten on him, Verhofstadt dominated the 
coverage in the Netherlands (Gattermann 2015). Moreover, the rates of recognition were the 
highest in their country of origin or one of the neighbouring (Schmitt et al. 2015: 11): in Ger-
many, 25% percent recognised without help at least one candidate, in Luxembourg it was even 
55%. The data, including only four countries, three of them (at least close) neighbours, does 
not allow to control these effects for all the Spitzenkandidaten but at least for Schulz and Keller 
in Germany and Bové in France the “home-game” effect shall be checked. 
Effect of pro-European attitudes: Another factor distorting the coverage of the Spitzenkan-
didaten is whether a country is friendly on European integration. As differences in the 
Spitzenkandidaten visibility across the countries were not due to the different media systems 
and their receptiveness to personalisation there must be another explaining factor: the friendli-
ness towards European integration of the elites and the public sphere of a country (Gattermann 
2015). For example, in the UK all three parties did not invite the lead candidates to their cam-
paign events. Next to Hungary the UK was the only country the Spitzenkandidaten did not visit. 
David Cameron, the British Prime Minister voted against the appointment of Juncker in the 
council (Christiansen 2016: 998). 
 
Figure 3: Mean position on European Integration by all parties per country.  
This is categorisation of the countries is evaluated in figure 4 that shows the overall quality of 
how it was spoken about European integration in each country. The downward trend is obvious 
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and, in all countries, the public opinion on European integration seems to be less positive in 
2014 than it was in 1999, but yet the UK is the only country with negative values. The UK is 
categorised as critical to the EU, whereas the other three countries are classified as pro-EU. It 
shall be tested if the country more opposed to European integration neglected the Spitzenkan-
didaten in their coverage or if the coverage was more negatively.  
5. Results 
The Analysis of the results proceeds as follows. First, the general position of the Spitzenkandi-
daten in the dataset shall be evaluated. This gives us information about whether the Spitzenkan-
didaten were able to dominate the debate with their electoral programmes, making European 
actors and issues more visible and creating a real debate about the future of the European Union. 
There the control variables of “home-game effects” and the impact of the EU integration friend-
liness of a country shall be considered. Afterwards, it shall be tested whether there was a polit-
icisation of the European elections at all in 2014 compared to 2009. In the last section the impact 
of the Spitzenkandidaten and the other two control variables – the impact of the Euro-crisis and 
the success of the EU-sceptic parties – on the politicisation shall come under scrutiny. 
5.1 Exploring the Spitzenkandidaten in the Data 
In this step the advantages of the data shall be used to explore a bit the actual appearance of the 
Spitzenkandidaten in the public debate: of how, to which extent, in which quality, by which 




Figure 4: Share of core sentences by the 
Spitzenkandidaten in 2014 by country 
Figure 5: Share of core sentences of the 
Spitzenkandidaten in 2014 by country 
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The Spitzenkandidaten were coded in the dataset both – in the function of subjects and objects, 
i.e. in their function as subject actors taking positions on issues and as object actors being dis-
cussed by other actors. In the 4.887 core sentences of 2014, the Spitzenkandidaten appeared as 
subject 306 times and as object 231 times. This means they amounted around 11% of the debate. 
The considerably high rate of object mentions compared to subject mentions indicates that other 
actors indeed have discussed the Spitzenkandidaten system. 
Figure 4 shows the share of the Spitzenkandidaten in the individual countries. They were most 
visible in the German and Austrian press followed by France, while they remained nearly un-
mentioned in British newspapers. This is in line with the observations of other media content 
analysis such as Schulze (2016) and Gattermann (2015: 219) and the results of Hix and Wilks-
Heeg (2014) about the generally lower coverage in the UK about the Spitzenkandidaten. 
Figure 5 shows the share of core sentences of each Spitzenkandidat by country. The observa-
tions of this cannot verify the assumption of “home-game effects” finally as only two of the 
five home countries are included in the data set, but they do also not completely falsify them. 
The assumption that the Spitzenkandidaten were the most visible in their home country is true 
for Martin Schulz and Ska Keller in Germany but not for José Bové in France. The thesis that 
they might be more visible in a neighbouring country, because there the chance that they are 
known and being recognised is the highest, is difficult to answer with this data because Ger-
many, France and Austria are neighbours or at least very nearby. There would be needed other 
comparative cases. So, Jean Claude Juncker was the most visible actor in Austria and France, 
which are both not far away from Luxembourg but this does not explain why he was more 
visible than Martin Schulz, whose direct neighbours are France and Austria. As Schulz was the 
most engaged in campaigning, this relatively higher visibility can only be explained by the 
relative higher chance of Jean Claude Juncker to win (Hobolt 2014). Nevertheless, the number 
of cases including the Spitzenkandidaten is not high enough to guarantee reliability that these 
observations might be due to coincidence and completely arbitrary. 
At least the assumption that the Spitzenkandidaten were less visible in countries that are less 
friendly to European integration is mirrored by the fact that the Spitzenkandidaten were less 
visible in the UK compared to the other three countries. 
Figure 6 supports the observation of Schulze (2016: 25) that national actors were still reported 
on more frequently than European actors. Even though Schulz was the most visible actor in 
Germany and Juncker the most visible in Austria and Guy Verhofstadt was at least in France 
and Austria, there are still in relation much more national politicians that were as visible. In the 
UK there were no Spitzenkandidaten but Cameron, Farage, Wilders and Le Pen under the most 
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visible actors, indicating a highly Eurosceptic media coverage. Marine Le Pen was also the 
most visible actor in France and directly after Schulz in Germany and as visible as Merkel in 
Austria indicating a strong campaign impact of the Eurosceptic parties. 
     
     
Figure 6: Most visible actors per country, 2014 
 
Visibility over time 
  
Figure 7: Visibility of the Spitzenkandi-
daten over time of the campaign 
Figure 8: Visibility of the Spitzenkandi-
daten over time of the campaign by coun-
try 
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Figure 7 shows the visibility of the Spitzenkandidaten over the election campaign time. Schulze 
(2016: 24) observed that the candidates focused their campaign activities on the last three to 
four weeks before the elections, resulting in an intensified effort during May, the month of the 
election. The elections took place on the 22 to 25 May 2014. In this period there is indeed some 
visibility. But there is a complete gap in the last week before the elections. The Figure shows 
the number of core sentences each day. So even the peak of 26 sentences in an absolute number 
of 4887 core sentences, what means around 160 sentences per day, does go under in the noise. 
Gattermann (2015) finds that the TV debates increased visibility of Spitzenkandidaten. Indeed, 
there is a peak at the 8th of May when Juncker and Schulz debated in Berlin but already at the 
13th of May, the day of Juncker’s and Schultz’ debate in Paris there is this settled low. The 
values of the visibility in the individual countries over time in Figure 8 support these observa-
tions. Germany as well as Austria and France show a peak around the 8th and then again at the 
days of election. In the UK the Spitzenkandidaten are nearly invisible. But also here an inter-
pretation is not highly reliable as the values are not enough to guarantee reliability. But already 
this observation of low observations manifests the one most important: that the Spitzenkandi-
daten did not play a big role in the public debate. 
Issues 
    
Figure 9: Most salient topics overall Figure 10: Topics the Spitzenkandidaten 
talked the most about 
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Actors and quality 
      
Figure 11: Actors that mentioned the 
Spitzenkandidaten most often 
Figure 12: General position in average on 
the Spitzenkandidaten of each country  
Comparing the most discussed topics by the Spitzenkandidaten in Figure 10 with the most dis-
cussed issues in general, the observation can be made that the issue of the Presidency of the 
Commission was the third biggest in general. Moreover, they both had European Integration in 
general as the most salient topic. But as there was a high number of issues coded, the values for 
each issue are not really high. Top three under the Spitzenkandidaten was ‘the willingness of 
turkey to reforms’ even though one might ask himself if this was really the most crucial problem 
on the agenda of the candidates in 2014 as the debate about the Turkish accession became only 
lately in 2017 salient after the referendum in Turkey. This suggests a bias produced by the small 
amount of values. Besides their position on a strong or hard euro it doesn’t seem as any efforts 
of the Spitzenkandidaten to present an electoral programme for their mandate and to discuss 
their views on the detailed solution on the challenges of European integration and future policy 
have found their way into news coverage. This indicates that the personalisation did not have 
an impact on that there finally would be discussed common solutions or competing visions for 
the future of European integration in European elections. 
A look at Figure 10 and 11 about which topics were those most discussed by the Spitzenkandi-
daten and by which actors the Spitzenkandidaten were the most discussed, shows that in fact 
the Spitzenkandidaten stayed highly self-referential. Two of the top issues they discussed – next 
to European integration in general – were the presidency of the commission and the Spitzenkan-
didaten system. Moreover, next to Angela Merkel and David Cameron, the two actors talking 
the most about the Spitzenkandidaten were the Spitzenkandidaten themselves. Figure 12 shows 
the general position in which was spoken about the Spitzenkandidaten in the countries. Not 
surprisingly the stance of the UK was rather negative whereas in France there seems to have 
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been a rather positive connotation of the Spitzenkandidaten. Austria and Germany are relatively 
neutral. 
In Figure 22 and 24 (Appendix) the quality in coverage is listed in more detail in the first refer-
ring to the quality the other actors evaluated the Spitzenkandidaten and in the latter the positions 
of the parties per country on the Spitzenkandidaten. These observations show that the thesis of 
Schmitt, Popa and Rohrschneider (2015), is not only applicable for citizens attitudes but also 
politicians and parties. The Spitzenkandidaten were evaluated as negatively by those who al-
ready have a negative attitude on European integration – David Cameron, Beppe Grillo, Victor 
Orban and their parties the Conservatives, the Movimento 5 Stelle, Fidesz – and welcomed 
positively by those who support European integration – Emanuel Barroso, Angela Merkel, Wer-
ner Faymann, the EPP (European Peoples Party). By this one could gather that the Spitzenkan-
didaten indeed had a polarising effect also in this data. It also is symptomatic that Victor Orban 
and David Cameron the both heads of state voting against Juncker as a President in the Council 
are some of the loudest opponents in the media. The negative positions of Schulz and Juncker 
in the Austrian media on the Spitzenkandidaten might have been themselves criticising one 
another. All in all, this analysis can confirm a big part of the observations of previous literature. 
The Spitzenkandidaten were not invisible but far from having real structuring influence on the 
debate. 
5.2 Politicisation between 2009 and 2014 
Salience 
    
Figure 13: Salience of the issue of Euro-
pean integration in the relation to all other 
issues in the campaign (NPW) 
Figure 14: Salience of European Integra-
tion in relation to all other issues by coun-
try (NPW) 
Even though it might have been due to other factors than the introduction of the Spitzenkandi-
daten System, the state of research showed that in the European elections of 2014, Europe was 
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more salient than in any previous election before (Hobolt 2015: 7, Hobolt 2014: 1534). Surpris-
ingly this is not mirrored by the salience analysis of this work in the NPW-dataset. The NPW 
data is the data, in which all issues that appeared during the time of campaign are coded. This 
allows to calculate the salience of the EU issue in relation to all issues. It is measured by the 
share of EU-concerning core sentences as a percentage of all core sentences (including every 
political issue). 
As figure 13 shows, salience of European integration has been slightly declining over time and 
was higher in 1999 than in 2009, the year of the beginning of the Euro-crisis and decreased 
even more rapidly from 2009 to 2014. While in 2009 European integration had a relatively low 
salience of 20%, its salience even went down to 12% until 2014. A look into the development 
of the EU salience in the individual member states shows the same downward trend. In Ger-
many, European integration has never been highly salient, ranging on around 8%, but in France, 
where the whole political culture and debate is more stimulated, European integration still had 
a salience of around 30% in 2009. There has been a decrease in 2014 to a value lower than in 
1999. The same can be reported for Austria with a peak in 2009 on 20% and a declining share 
since that date. In the UK, the issue of European integration has had the highest salience of all 
in the 1990s but has since 2004 decreased to a low level similar to the one of Germany. 
Polarisation 
 
Figure 15: Polarisation of all parties per country on the issue of European Integration from 
1999-2014 calculated by the mean of the variance of the direction (PolEU) 
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Looking at polarisation, the second factor of politicisation, there is rather the observation of an 
increasing curve. The polarisation has been calculated in the PolEU data by the mean of the 
variance of the direction of all party positions on EU integration in a country. In nearly all of 
the countries figure 15 shows a constant and not to be underestimated increase of polarisation 
on European integration. In Germany and the UK, the polarisation decreased a bit or remained 
stable between 2009 and 2014 but in Austria and France there can be recorded an increase. This 
partly goes in line with the post functionalist theory that argues that the sleeping giant has been 
awoken and that now the opposing and challenging stances of the citizens on European integra-
tion have finally become salient (Hooghe, Marks 2009). In point three of this analysis it shall 
be analysed whether the Spitzenkandidaten had indeed a polarising effect (Schmitt, Popa, 
Rohrschneider 2015) or if it was the Euro-crisis that finally woke up the sleeping giant or the 
driving factor of was the EU-sceptic parties. 
Since salience is the necessary condition of politicisation, already at this point it is clear that as 
there is no increase in salience one cannot speak of an increase in politicisation. This is the case 
independent from any effect of the increased polarisation or the introduction of the Spitzenkan-
didaten system, because even if they might have been important inside the EU issue, it was not 
visible in the whole debate as the EU issue was not. Even though H 1.1 and H 1.2 shall be 
verified in the third point, H1 can already be generally dismissed. This result throws a critical 
light on predictions of the politicisation literature that suggests a likely increase of politicisation 
in the future (Hooghe, Marks 2009). Grande et al. looked at the national public sphere and found 
a rather fluctuating curve of politicisation (Hutter, Grande, Kriesi 2016). If this result is condi-
tioned by the general second-order character of European elections, the high values of salience 
in France are highly contradictory. This shall be discussed further in the conclusions. 
5.3 Influence of Spitzenkandidaten, Eurosceptic parties and the Euro-crisis 
The last chapter contextualises the effect of the Spitzenkandidaten by comparing their impact 
on politicisation to the impact of the control variables for Eurosceptic parties and the Euro-
crisis. 
 
To make the effects on polarisation better 
comparable, see Figure 15. 
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Figure 16: Salience of the Spitzenkandi-
daten 
 
Figure 17: Influence of the Spitzenkandi-
daten on Polarisation (value of the overall 
polarisation, the values of the Spitzenkan-
didaten subtracted) 
The salience of the Spitzenkandidaten (Figure 16) in the PolEU is rather low and as salience 
sunk from 2009 to 2014 it does not seem that the Spitzenkandidaten had any effect in making 
European elections more European and raising the salience of the EU issue in the debate. H 1.1 
has to be dismissed. 
After the prevouis analysis one might have assumed that the Spitzenkandidaten might have 
increased polarisation. Figure 17 shows the polarisation of the campaign in 2014 without the 
Spitzenkandidaten. Between the general polarisation graph (Figure 15) and the graph show po-
larisation of the Spitzenkandidaten (Figure 17) there is nearly no difference to be found. Polar-
isation was a bit higher without the Spitzenkandidaten in Germany and France but these effects 
are so minimal that they are almost not worth mentioning. So the Spitzenkandidaten also had 
no (significant) effect on polarisation, H1.2 has to be dismissed.  
The question whether the Spitzenkandidaten had any impact on the politicisation of European 
integration has been proved wrong. 
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EU-sceptic parties  
     
Figure 18: Salience of the Eurosceptic 
parties 
 
Figure 19: Influence of the Eurosceptic 
Parties on Polarisation (value of the overall 
polarisation, the values of the Eurosceptic 
Parties subtracted ) 
The salience of eurosceptic parties with 948 of 4887 core sentences seems to indicate higher 
salience of Eurosceptic parties than of the Spitzenkandidaten. Unsurprisingly they are most 
salient in the UK, this is mostly because the Conservative Party has been classified as EU-
sceptic. But still also they did not increase the salience of European integration in the campaign 
although they were the winners of the 2014 EP elections. In Figure 19 the graph indicates again 
the difference of polarisation without the impact of the Eurosceptic parties. There are minor 
effects in all the countries. In the United Kingdom the graph rises more without the Euroseptic 
parties, which means that Polarisation increases. This might be due to the fact that the Con-
servatives as a large party highly dominate the British debate and distort the mean of variance. 
In the other countries polarisation is significantly lower without the Eurosceptic parties on a 
range around 0.2. This is in line with Grande et al. who found that Eurosceptic parties did in 
some cases indeed contribute to politicisation, but they are “neither a necessary nor a sufficient 




     
Figure 20: Salience of the Euro-crisis 
 
Figure 21: Influence of the Euro-crisis on 
Polarisation (value of the overall polarisa-
tion, the values of the Euro-crisis sub-
tracted) 
The core sentences on the Euro-crisis issue make a number of 412 out of 4887, which is not 
this high considering that it was stated that the election would take place in the light of the most 
severe economic crisis that Europe has seen since world war two (Hobolt 2015: 6). The issue 
has been slightly more salient in Germany than in the other countries (Figure 22). Figure 21 
shows the value of polarisation when the observation of the issue of the Euro-crisis are sub-
tracted. Moreover, the Euro-crisis does not have any major effect on polarisation. So this is in 
line with Schmitt and Toygür (2017) who found that the politicisation of the Euro-crisis in the 
south European states did not lead to any sort of critical elections, detaching euopean elections 
from their second-order character. 
6. Conclusion – Still a long way to go 
The introduction of the Spitzenkandidaten system was connected with high expectations to gen-
erate a politicisation of the European elections, by personalised competition of different visions 
of the EU, attract the media’s coverage and the citizens’ interest. The 2014 EP elections still 
were second-order elections, the Spitzenkandidaten were nearly invisible in media coverage, 
only a small amount of EU citizens was aware of the Spitzenkandidaten and able to identify 
them. Moreover, the parties did not include them into their electoral campaigns and the only 
real influence found is that they changed the inter-institutional balance of power by increasing 
the influence of the EP. The results of this analysis are in line with these observations. 
A closer look at how and to which extent the Spitzenkandidaten were visible in public debate 
shows that the Spitzenkandidaten were visible, but to a very limited extent. Their appearance 
in the data goes parallel with some of the observations of previous media content analysis on 
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their visibility. They were most visible in Germany, followed by Austria, France and the UK, 
where they remained almost uncovered. The “home-game” effect was applicable for Martin 
Schulz in Germany but cannot explain the high dominance of Juncker in Austria. The influence 
of the overall attitude of a country regarding European integration was true for the UK. In ad-
dition, the Spitzenkandidaten seemed to be more visible after the debate on 8th May 2014 but 
were nearly invisible the last week before the elections. This can only can be explained by the 
low rate of core sentences and observations, which makes a reliable interpretation very difficult. 
Additionally, it seems that those who support European integration have welcomed the 
Spitzenkandidaten while Eurosceptics opposed them. Even though one could have interpreted 
these as polarising tendencies, they did not have any effect. 
By using the NPW and PolEu media content analysis data set of the DFG project, the core of 
the analysis was whether the introduction of the Spitzenkandidaten had any impact on the po-
liticisation of the public debate in 2014 compared to 2009. There was no evidence that the 
politicisation of the 2014 elections was higher than in 2009. The basic indicators for a rise in 
politicisation were the increase of salience of the EU issue compared to the other issues and 
increased polarisation. The theoretical expectation was that both should indicate that the issue 
of European integration was discussed in public debate more often and intense. The analysis 
shows, that compared to 2009, in 2014 there was not only no increase of salience but even a 
slight decrease. Although there was a slight increase of polarisation of the issue, this does not 
lead to more politicisation, since salience is a necessary prerequisite. Thus, there is no support 
for H1. The Spitzenkandidaten not only largely failed in dominating the debate overall, there 
was no sign at all that their introduction led to distinct debates on European policies entering 
the public sphere either. 
Looking at the control variables, this analysis found that the Eurosceptic parties as well as the 
Euro-crisis had to some extent a positive effect on polarisation even if this was rather small. 
They were to some extent salient in the debate in PolEU but they did not contribute to an in-
crease in salience of the EU issue in the general campaign in NPW. In conclusion, this analysis 
finds that neither the Spitzenkandidaten nor Eurosceptic parties or the Euro-crisis led to a big 
change that would finally tear down the dam of permissive consensus, hereby bringing to light 
the real positions on EU issues. It seems that even if the topic of European integration becomes 
politicised in national public spheres and elections, this was not applicable for the 2014 EP 
elections. Earlier literature has found evidence that the debate about European integration has 
been politicised in the last decade especially by events such as the euro crisis (cf. Grande, Kriesi 
2016) and that the sleeping giant is now awake (Hooghe, Marks 2009). One could ask why none 
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of the examined factors could change anything about the character of the European elections or 
the public debate during their campaign phase. 
Grande and Braun formulate in their concept of political structuring three prerequisites that are 
crucial for European elections to finally create a close electoral connection between the citizens 
and the institutions of the European Union. These three must be present in order to achieve any 
mobilising and legitimising impact: a close connection between the programs of the parties, the 
preferences of the voters and their discussion in public sphere. The success of the Spitzenkan-
didaten was from the beginning dependent on several aspects that were not given but hoped to 
be established by them. The problem of the European elections is that there is no Europe-wide 
party system. The election campaigns of the parties are fragmented, there is no European public 
sphere, the media does not cover them enough, the elections are not about European issues and 
there is not much at stake. However, as large parts of the citizens did not know about their 
existence, their effect was rather small.  
“This time it’s different” – “next time it is better”. Nearly all of the literature concludes with 
explanations why the Spitzenkandidaten system did not work out perfectly in the first attempt. 
It is argued that the system was only in its infancy (Hobolt 2014) or the system was too complex 
to have such a mechanism work at the first try (Van der Brug, Gattermann, De Vreese 2016). 
Moreover, there are expectations on what will ease their way in the next elections: there will be 
an incumbent to vote on (Schmitt, Hobolt and Popa 2015: 18), there would be greater competi-
tion if also smaller and Eurosceptic parties nominated candidates (Christiansen 2016: 1008), 
the selection procedure and the campaigns will further professionalise (Put et al. 2016) and lead 
the EU-wide party collaboration to intensify. Moreover, citizens might know more about the 
Spitzenkandidaten system by then. There seems to be a consensus that the Spitzenkandidaten 
system will gain impact over time, and slowly change the character of European elections. As 
the previous discussion has made clear, this work would argue that, for the Spitzenkandidaten 
to have any impact on this, it is still a long way to go. 
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